



**Nevada
Irrigation
District**

Continuity of Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza

Version 1.1

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Nevada Irrigation District

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I. INTRODUCTION

Organizations across the Nation perform essential functions and services that may be adversely affected in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. In such events, the Nevada Irrigation District (NID/District) will have continuity plans to assist in the continuance of their essential functions. Continuing to perform essential functions and provide essential services is vital to NID's ability to remain a viable entity during times of increased threats from all hazards, manmade or natural. Since the threat to an organization's continuity of operations is great during a pandemic outbreak; it is important for organizations, in particular the Nevada Irrigation District, to have a Continuity of Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza (Plan) in place to ensure it can carry out its essential functions and services. While organizations may be forced to suspend some operations due to the severity of a pandemic outbreak, an effective Plan will assist NID in its efforts to remain operational, as well as strengthen the ability to resume operations.

II. PURPOSE

This Plan provides guidance to NID and will ensure essential functions and services are maintained during an influenza pandemic. This Plan neither replaces nor supersedes any current, approved continuity plan; rather it supplements it, bridging the gap between traditional, all-hazards continuity planning and the specialized continuity planning required for a pandemic by addressing additional considerations, challenges, and elements specific to the dynamic nature of a pandemic.

This Plan stresses that essential functions will be maintained during a pandemic outbreak through mitigation strategies, such as social distancing, increased hygiene, the vaccination of employees and their families, and similar approaches. Influenza may not, in itself, require a traditional continuity response, such as partial or full relocation of the organization's essential functions, although this response may be concurrently necessary due to other circumstances.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The District will monitor the severity of the pandemic and establish continuity activation triggers to address the unique nature of the pandemic threat. The Plan will be implemented as needed to support the continued performance of essential functions.

IV. CONTINUITY PLANNING

All employees are to be informed regarding protective actions and/or modifications related to this Plan. Messaging and risk communications during an emerging infectious disease or pandemic will be conducted by the Incident Command (IC) staff. Guidance and instructions on established infection control measures such as social distancing, personnel protective equipment and telework policies are provided by the IC to assist in limiting the spread of influenza at the District headquarters, field offices, and staffed facilities.

Within the workplace, social distancing measures could take the form of: modifying the frequency and type of face-to-face employee encounters (e.g., substituting teleconferences for face-to-face meetings, posting infection control guidelines); establishing flexible work hours or worksites, (e.g., telecommuting as appropriate); promoting social distancing between employees and customers to maintain spatial

separation between individuals; shifting to phone and/or e-mail correspondence only for customers and public; and implementing strategies that requires and enable employees with influenza to stay home at the first sign of symptoms.

Frequent, daily contact is important to keep employees informed about developments in the organization's response, impacts on the workforce, and to reassure employees that the organization is continuing to function as usual. Messages from Department or Section leaders will follow the General Manager's and Incident Commander's messages and will echo those message themes and tone.

Planners and pandemic response teams must include deliberate methods to measure, monitor, and adjust actions to changing conditions and improved protection strategies into their specific action plans, including:

- Implement a formal worker and workplace protection strategy with metrics for assessing worker conformance and workplace cleanliness
- Monitor and periodically test protection methods
- Track and implement changes in approved or recommended protection measures
- Pre-position material and equipment onsite
- Reaffirm that essential suppliers have their material and personnel on-hand and are able to respond and support the District's needs as planned
- Coordinate with local public health and emergency response points of contact to ensure open, adequate communications

Component-specific risk assessments for all District service sectors will be conducted by the service sector (Department) point of contact (POC). These assessments are kept as part of each Department Specific Action Plan (DSAP) documentation.

V. PANDEMIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions outlined in this section were used to develop the Plan.

A. National Strategy for Influenza Assumptions

- Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.
- Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent pandemic.
- Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection.
- Rates of serious illness, hospitalization, and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus and differ by an order of magnitude between more and less severe scenarios. Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty, but specific risk groups will likely include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and persons with chronic or immunosuppressive medical conditions.
- Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family members and fear of infection may reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before and after the peak. Certain public health measures (closing organizations, quarantining household contacts of infected individuals, "snow days") are likely to increase rates of absenteeism.

- A typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately two days.
- Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection before the onset of symptoms. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first two days of illness.
- On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other people.
- A pandemic outbreak in any given community will last about six to eight weeks for each wave of the pandemic.
- Multiple waves of illness could occur with each wave lasting two to three months. Historically, the largest waves have occurred in fall and winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.

B. Organizational Assumptions

- NID will be provided with guidance and/or direction by Federal, State, and/or local governments regarding current influenza pandemic status in its service area.
- NID will have an actionable plan and procedures to assist in the ability to remain operational during a pandemic. Specific Action Plans and procedures shall include social distancing protocols, personal protection equipment (PPE), and temporary suspension of some non-essential activities.
- NID has a viable District-wide COOP and each service sector has also developed a COOP implementation plan.
- NID-controlled buildings will be accessible, but right of public entry may be limited (or suspended).
- Essential functions, operations, and support requirements will continue to be people dependent. However, human interactions may be remote or virtual, resulting in the employment of appropriate teleworking and other approved social distancing protocols.
- Travel restrictions implemented at the Federal, State, and local levels may affect the ability of some staff to report to work.
- Additional funding will be available for the acquisition of additional equipment required for a possible surge in teleworking capabilities.

VI. PANDEMIC RESPONSE

In the event a Phase 4 Pandemic Influenza has been declared in the United States or a Phase 5 Pandemic has been declared by the World Health Organization (WHO), the District will activate the initial phase of its Incident Command Structure (ICS) including identification of an Incident Commander (IC). Guidance on the various phases of a pandemic are included in Appendix 1 of the District's Pandemic Influenza Contingency of Operations Plan. Guidance on the ICS structure and roles can be found in Appendix 2.

The IC will activate specific roles and groups identified in the District's Incident Command Structure as necessary to prepare for a full-scale event in the region. Notifications and updates from the IC will be delivered to the District workforce via District e-mail, bulletin board posting, and/or phone message.

A. Pandemic Coordinators and Pandemic Response Teams

The NID IC will act as the Pandemic Influenza Coordinator and will oversee the District's Response. Activation of the ICS will commission two main phases of the pandemic response as follows:

- Planning Phase

- Implementation Phase

1) Planning Phase

The Planning Phase is designed to be a quick-implementation and short in duration (less than a week).

The IC will commission and oversee a Pandemic Response Planning Team (PRPT) to anticipate the impacts of a pandemic on NID and to assist with developing strategies to manage the effects of an outbreak. The IC will identify individuals with specific skill-sets and/or contacts to initiate planning and preparation activities prior to declaration of a local event/emergency.

Population of individual names into the Incident Command Structure Organizational Chart will also be performed during the Planning Phase of a pandemic response.


The products (deliverables) of this Phase will be an Incident Specific Action Plan (ISAP) and Department Specific Action Plans (DSAPs) for use during the Implementation Phase. A template ISAP is included as Appendix 3 of this document.

2) Implementation Phase


As soon as necessary, after the Planning Phase, the IC will activate the Implementation Phase of the Pandemic Coordination and Response. During this phase, the District will implement the ICS as outlined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). In this phase, the IC will commission specific roles in the ICS to begin mitigation/response activities. This includes purchasing supplies, securing contracts, messaging to workforce, identifying alternate work space/schedule preparations and testing, and defining the inter-agency communication structure. The ISAP prepared by the PRPT during the Planning Phase will be a tool used by the ICS team during the Implementation Phase.

As the pandemic event increases in effect, the IC will commission additional roles and Sections in the ICS as necessary to meet the needs of the District's mission. The Implementation Phase will remain active for the duration of the pandemic event. Throughout the response, updates to the ISAP will be performed as necessary.

The NID ICS is comprised of several key sections and roles necessary for the effective operation of the District's mission and goals. A template ICS Organizational Chart is presented below for reference.

 Nevada Irrigation District	INCIDENT NAME:	
	FATR:	
	VERSION / DATE / TIME:	
	OPS PERIOD:	

INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



As outlined in the ISAP the ICS Organizational Chart is accompanied by a Contact Sheet (with the same version number and date stamp) listing current contact information for each individual identified on the chart. The ICS Organizational Chart (and Contact Sheet) shall be updated as necessary during the course of the pandemic response to identify changes in personnel assignments and which roles/groups are activated during the specified operational period.

B. Risk Communications

NID will develop influenza pandemic risk communication procedures for communicating with all internal and external stakeholders. This includes the use of existing notification rosters, website news updates, mutual aid and emergency response agency rosters. Rosters and communication level/frequency shall be included in the ISAP and maintained by the ICS during event response.

VII. ELEMENTS OF A VIABLE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA CONTINUITY CAPABILITY

This section address the elements of operational continuity within the context of a pandemic influenza outbreak. In general information outlined in this section will be identified in the ISAP as conditions dictate.

A. Essential Functions

Given the expected duration and potential multiple waves of pandemic outbreaks, The District has reviewed the processes involved in carrying out essential functions and services in order to develop plans that mitigate the effects of the pandemic while simultaneously allowing the continuation of operations which support essential functions. The Nevada Irrigation District has identified essential functions and services needed to sustain its mission and operations during a pandemic.

B. Orders of Succession

Since influenza pandemic may affect regions of the United States differently in terms of timing, severity, and duration, Nevada Irrigation District has identified orders of succession in its ICS and each DSAP that are at least three deep per position while considering dispersing successors to various geographically separated locations, as appropriate. The purpose of these measures is to maintain a continuity of availability for identified staff – in the event that one of the individuals (or locations) experiences an influenza exposure.

C. Delegations of Authority

At the height of a pandemic wave, absenteeism may be significant. As such, NID will established delegations of authority for each role that are at least three deep to take into account the expected rate of absenteeism and regional nature of the outbreak to help assure continuity of operations over an extended period.

D. Continuity Facilities

The traditional use of continuity facilities to maintain essential functions and services may not be a viable option during a pandemic. Rather, safe work practices, which include social distancing and transmission interventions, reduce the likelihood of contacts with other people that could lead to disease transmission. NID has identified preventative practices for implementation, such as:

- Cancellation of public meetings
- Social distancing procedures
- Cancellation of non-essential travel (professional organizations/training)
- Postponement of internal group training events
- Heightened cleaning frequency and additional cleaning measures
- Direct reporting to duty locations for field staff (rather than to Headquarters or Field Office)
- Reduction in crew size to no-more than two individuals for close-proximity work
- Cancellation of non-essential meetings and/or work with contractors

E. Continuity Communications

According to the National Strategy Implementation Guidance, workplace risk can be minimized through implementation of systems and technologies that facilitate communication without person-to-person contact. NID will identify communication system needs in order to implement remote, virtual connectivity of staff in order to perform essential functions.

F. Essential Records Management

NID shall identify, protect, and ensure the ready availability of electronic and hardcopy documents, references, records, and information systems needed to support essential functions during a pandemic outbreak. NID shall (as part of the Planning Phase of pandemic response) identify systems, databases, and files that are needed to make certain essential functions remain operational. As such, the District shall track costs and establish an electronic file location for the event. The details and file locations shall be included in the ISAP.

G. Human Resources

Although a pandemic influenza outbreak may not directly affect the physical infrastructure of an organization, a pandemic will ultimately threaten all operations by its impact on an organization's human resources. The health threat to personnel is the primary threat to maintaining essential functions and services during a pandemic outbreak.

NID has established structure and template language for a pandemic response plan, which includes mitigation measures for protection of the entire employee population and their families, with additional guidance for key personnel, leadership, line staff, and other essential personnel, in the event of a pandemic outbreak.

Mitigation measures for human resources specific to the pandemic event shall be included in the DSAP Sections of the ISAP document.

H. Testing Training and Exercises

Testing, training, and exercising are essential to assessing, demonstrating, and improving an organization's ability to maintain its essential functions and services. NID shall conduct regular tests, training, and tabletop exercises of this COOP with the following goals:

- Make sure management and key staff remain familiar with the elements and sequence of preparing and implementing the ISAP and ICS
- Conduct continuity exercises to examine the potential impacts of pandemic influenza on performing essential functions
- Identify gaps or necessary updates to the plan documents

I. Devolution of Control and Direction

Devolution is the process of transferring operational control of one or more essential functions to a pre-determined responsible party (or parties). Pandemic outbreaks have variable durations and severity, and it is possible that the impacts to the District may be so severe that maintaining critical/essential functions is not possible with District staff. In this instance, full or partial devolution of essential functions may be necessary to continue to provide essential functions and services to the District's service area.

NID has established plans and procedures for devolution, which identifies how it will transfer specific organizational administration and/or operational functions, if pandemic influenza renders leadership and/or essential staff unavailable. As such the District Board of Directors shall declare an emergency and give the General Manager increased authority to allow for rapid action to address the situation.

J. Reconstitution

Reconstitution is the process whereby an organization has regained the capability and resources necessary to return to normal (pre-emergency) operations. The objective during reconstitution is to effectively manage, control, and expedite the safe return to normal operations. A reconstitution plan responsive to the specific pandemic event circumstances presented shall be developed during the Planning Phase of the pandemic response. The reconstitution plan must be updated during the Implementation Phase, as necessary, using updated information available during the pandemic event.

NID's reconstitution plan must consider the possibility that not all employees may be able to return to work at the time of reconstitution and it may be necessary to hire temporary staff or contractors in order to complete the reconstitution process.

A Reconstitution Plan will be developed as part of the ISAP.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Maintaining Nevada Irrigation District's essential functions and services in the event of pandemic influenza requires additional considerations beyond traditional continuity planning. Unlike other hazards that necessitate the relocation of staff performing essential functions to an alternate operating facility, an influenza pandemic may not directly affect the physical infrastructure of the organization. As such, a traditional "continuity activation" may not be required during a pandemic influenza outbreak. However, a pandemic outbreak threatens an organization's human resources by removing essential personnel from the workplace for extended periods of time. Accordingly, NID's Plan addresses the threat of a pandemic influenza outbreak.

Protecting the health and safety of personnel must be the focused goal of the organization in order to enable the organizations to continue to operate effectively and to perform essential functions and provide essential services during a pandemic outbreak.

APPENDIX 1: WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION PHASES

The World Health Organizations (WHO) developed an alert system to help inform the world about the seriousness of a pandemic. The alert system has six phases, with Phase 1 having the lowest risk of human cases and Phase 6 posing the greatest risk of pandemic. Organizations are encouraged to monitor the WHO phases and establish continuity “triggers” as deemed appropriate.

The phases are applicable globally and provide a framework to aid countries in pandemic preparedness and response planning. The use of a six-phased approach has been retained. However, the pandemic phases have been re-defined (Table 1). In addition, the time after the first pandemic wave has been elaborated into post peak and post pandemic periods.

Table 1: World Health Organization Pandemic Influenza Phases

Phase 1	No animal influenza virus circulating among animals has been reported to cause infection in humans.
Phase 2	An animal influenza virus circulating in domesticated or wild animals is known to have caused infection in humans and is therefore considered a specific potential pandemic threat.
Phase 3	An animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community-level outbreaks.
Phase 4	Human-to-human transmission (H2H) of an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to sustain community-level outbreaks has been verified.
Phase 5	The same identified virus has caused sustained community level outbreaks in two or more countries in one WHO region.
Phase 6	In addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5, the same virus has caused sustained community level outbreaks in at least one other country in another WHO region.
Post-Peak Period	Levels of pandemic influenza in most countries with adequate surveillance have dropped below peak levels.
Possible New Wave	Level of pandemic influenza activity in most countries with adequate surveillance rising again.
Post-Pandemic Period	Levels of influenza activity have returned to the levels seen for seasonal influenza in most countries with adequate surveillance.

The WHO phases of pandemic alert:

In the 2009 revision of the phase descriptions, WHO has retained the use of a six-phased approach for easy incorporation of new recommendations and approaches into existing national preparedness and response plans. The grouping and description of pandemic phases have been revised to make them easier to understand, more precise, and based upon observable phenomena. Phases 1–3 correlate with preparedness, including capacity development and response planning activities, while Phases 4–6 clearly signal the need for response and mitigation efforts. Furthermore, periods after the first pandemic wave are elaborated to facilitate post pandemic recovery activities.

In nature, influenza viruses circulate continuously among animals, especially birds. Even though such viruses might theoretically develop into pandemic viruses, in Phase 1 no viruses circulating among animals have been reported to cause infections in humans.

In Phase 2 an animal influenza virus circulating among domesticated or wild animals is known to have caused infection in humans, and is therefore considered a potential pandemic threat.

In Phase 3, an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community-level outbreaks. Limited human-to-human transmission may occur under some circumstances, for example, when there is close contact between an infected person and an unprotected caregiver. However, limited transmission under such restricted circumstances does not indicate that the virus has gained the level of transmissibility among humans necessary to cause a pandemic.

Phase 4 is characterized by verified human-to-human transmission of an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to cause “community-level outbreaks.” The ability to cause sustained disease outbreaks in a community marks a significant upwards shift in the risk for a pandemic. Any country that suspects or has verified such an event should urgently consult with WHO so that the situation can be jointly assessed and a decision made by the affected country if implementation of a rapid pandemic containment operation is warranted. Phase 4 indicates a significant increase in risk of a pandemic but does not necessarily mean that a pandemic is a forgone conclusion.

Phase 5 is characterized by human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two countries in one WHO region. While most countries will not be affected at this stage, the declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to finalize the organization, communication, and implementation of the planned mitigation measures is short.

Phase 6, the pandemic phase, is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way.

During the post-peak period, pandemic disease levels in most countries with adequate surveillance will have dropped below peak observed levels. The post-peak period signifies that pandemic activity appears to be decreasing; however, it is uncertain if additional waves will occur and countries will need to be prepared for a second wave.

Previous pandemics have been characterized by waves of activity spread over months. Once the level of disease activity drops, a critical communications task will be to balance this information with the possibility of another wave. Pandemic waves can be separated by months and an immediate “at-ease” signal may be premature.


APPENDIX 2: ICS for Utilities

ICS for Utilities

Why is ICS important for Utilities?

Many utilities in the U.S. understand the government construct under the National Response Framework (NRF); the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and tenets of the Incident Command System (ICS). Utilities also utilize the construct of mutual assistance allowing them to “loan” and “borrow” resources (human and material) between companies/agencies to promptly effect energy restoration activities using these or like frameworks. Taking an All Hazards approach to routine, daily business is the norm these days for utility companies and being more compatible with their first response partners when there is a “blue sky” emergency in the field on any given day has demonstrated the benefit of the Incident Command System for utilities. Utilities are now able to “scale” ICS from a “blue sky” day to a complex or long duration incident because the concepts are used more frequently. The majority of utilities in the U.S. are privately held corporations but also include municipal operations, special districts, and other government bodies. It is important that ICS for Utilities address all of these environments and configurations and that the tenets integrate between the public and private sectors.

How might the ICS Command Structure Look in a Utilities Environment?




Each utility is taking the foundational concepts of ICS and tailoring the system for their operations. Some utilities are using ICS for weather only related incidents and others are using it across their

company/agency for incidents beyond weather such as: Generation Plant outages, Wildfires involving facilities or lines; Data Center outages; Call Center outages; etc. When properly designed ICS will provide an integration strategy that includes all business units of the company/agency whether in a single corporate/agency environment or across multiple companies/agencies and multiple states or disciplines. Utilities are unique in terms of configuration – Electric and Gas; Electric and Water; Gas Only; and also include other energy provides like Fuel.

The most important implementation component is to remain true to the basic ICS structure (see diagram above) and build out from there. That way the company/agency will remain aligned with other utilities who may provide support during mutual assistance activations.

The system allows the utility to expand and contract the structure to manage span of control; to ensure appropriate resources are available and properly allocated; and that the entire company/agency remains on the same “operational” page during the response and recovery.

COMMAND STAFF



Incident Commander

The Incident Commander for a utility is likely a person who is broadly familiar with corporate/agency operations – whether in the Emergency Operations Center or at the scene in the Field at an Incident Command Post. Many utilities (private sector) have elevated their Executives to a Policy Team level (rather than leading Operations as an Incident Commander) so that they are available for policy level decisions and to interact with Government leaders during a large scale emergency. Therefore, the Executives have delegated authority for Incident Command to a high level staff member who is capable of managing the emergency response and recovery operations.

The Incident Commander is responsible for establishing incident objectives and activating other components of the Incident Management Team (IMT).

Many utilities are requiring their Incident Commanders to take additional levels of ICS training (I100, 200, 700, 300/400 and the IC “L” course) to strengthen their capacity and capabilities for serving in this role. Additional information on these courses is located here <https://training.fema.gov/>.

Public Information Officer (PIO)

Most, if not all utilities have a Public Relations department or business unit that is working daily on both internal and external communications with employees, customers, stakeholders and shareholders alike. Their transition into the Public Information Office (PIO) role is typically seamless during an emergency and in many instances they may be the first party contacted from the utility by the news media when something happens.

The most important task beyond their normal duties is to learn more about the Joint Information Center (JIC) and Joint Information System (JIS) environments to ensure the utility’s messaging is well aligned with those of its counterparts in other agencies/parts of the community. Additional information on PIO specific courses are located here <https://training.fema.gov/>.

Safety Officer (SO)

Like the PIO, most utilities have daily operational Safety Officers that are working across the utility environment to ensure worker and operational safety (internally and externally). Utilities work in a routinely dangerous environment and it is important that the Safety Officer is familiar with “blue sky” as well as emergency hazards that may escalate during non-routine operations. Most utilities have Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that include their safety tailboards and rules of engagement. The most important thing a utility can do is gather their Safety Team and walk through and discuss/document how conditions change during specific emergencies – fire; flood; earthquake; tornado; pipeline rupture; dig-in; etc. This will allow the utility to expand their traditional safety SOPs for any situation they may face. Then through routine drills and exercises, the responders and Safety Officers can work together to ensure the refined, emergency SOPs will protect both employees and the public during a response/recovery effort.


Liaison Officer (LO)

The Liaison Officer also exists in a variety of formats in many utility environments – whether based in an emergency management/business continuity, facility, customer focused or in a government affairs role. These utility staffers are consistently interacting and supporting the utility’s mission and objectives on a daily basis with their counterparts in other organizations.

The most important component of the LO in a utility is broadening the reach and brokering additional relationships with their counterparts and ensuring there is unity from the utility to the outside world. There are multiple internal/external relationships for differing purposes and the utility should work to ensure alignment within the company/agency and who is communicating with who and for what purpose.

GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff consists of up to four sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration. In an expanding incident the Incident Commander first establishes the Operations Section. The remaining sections are established as needed to support the operation.



Operations Section Chief (OSC)

The Operation Section is responsible for directing ALL tactical operational aspects of the incident. The key within a utility is to ensure specific Operations Section Chiefs exist with subject matter expertise for the incident/situation at hand. Because the utility environment has a great deal of diversity, it is important that each OSC has the knowledge, training and capabilities to manage the resources, logistical needs and safety of the incident. This can differ greatly -- as an example - a weather related incident involving multiple power outages vs. a fire at a generation plant.

Many utilities are requiring their OSCs to take additional levels of ICS training (I100, 200, 700, 300/400 and the OSC "L" course) to strengthen their capacity and capabilities for serving in this role. Additional information on these courses is located here <https://training.fema.gov/>.

Planning Section Chief (PSC)

The Planning Section is a pivotal role in many utilities as they are typically involved with dispatch in activating the emergency response system, the Incident Management Team (IMT) and/or opening the Emergency Operations/Coordination Center (EOC/ECC). The Planning Section Chief works with the Incident Commander in support of the Field operations to facilitate the Planning "P" cycle which includes - collects, evaluates and displays incident information, prepares and documents incident action plans, tracks resources assigned to the incident, maintains incident documentation and develops plans for demobilization.

The PSC collects and provides situational awareness which is tantamount to meeting incident objectives and maintaining safety.

Logistics Section Chief (LSC)

The Logistics Section is responsible for ensuring that there are adequate resources including personnel, supplies and equipment and are typically employed in the Supply Chain business unit of the utility.

They are usually familiar with contractors, contracts, purchasing and shipping/delivery methodologies and in some cases involved in the request for mutual assistance assets.

One of the important elements for the LSC is to begin tracking resources with the PSC at incident onset. This will assist the Finance Section with costs and claims later or after the incident.

Finance/Administration Section Chief (FSC)

The Finance/ Administration function manages paying for the incident or event response. This includes all aspects of financial and cost analysis: contract negotiation, tracking personnel and equipment time, documenting and processing claims for accidents and injuries occurring at the incident and keeping a running tally of costs associated with the incident. The Finance/ Administration Section works closely with Logistics to contract for and procure the resources needed to manage the incident.

There are differences between the public and private sector utility in that the public sector utility may be eligible for FEMA reimbursement following a declared emergency while a private sector utility will likely be dependent on insurance.

Application of Incident Command in Utilities

As the saying goes, if you have met one utility – you have met one utility. Applying ICS would depend on the type of utility: Electric, Gas, Water, Fuel, etc.

ICS would apply to many of these areas:

- Corporate/Agency IMT
- ICS in the Field including Unified Command
- Transmission & Distribution (Electric, Gas, Water, Fuel)
- Generation (Plant, Pipeline, Petroleum Refinery)
- IT/Data Center
- Call Center

Conclusion

For additional Information:

- FEMA ICS Resource Center, <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/>
- Additional ICS Training, <https://training.fema.gov/>



**Nevada
Irrigation
District**

Incident Specific Action Plan for [insert name of event]

TEMPLATE Version 3

Updated: March 25, 2020

Nevada Irrigation District

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Appendices – Department Specific Action Plans (DSAP)

Appendix A: Administration DSAP

Appendix B: Finance DSAP

Appendix C: Human Resources DSAP

Appendix D: Hydroelectric DSAP

Appendix E: Recreation DSAP

Appendix F: Water Maintenance DSAP

Appendix G: Water Operations DSAP

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Incident Specific Action Plan (ISAP) provides planning and information necessary to maintain essential functions and services that may be adversely affected during the current [insert event name] pandemic influenza. The plan will allow Nevada Irrigation District (NID/District) Incident Commander, Command Staff, and Section Chiefs to maintain essential operations during the pandemic, and resume regular operations once the event has passed.

The planning horizon for the current pandemic is [standard is 120] days.

The ISAP builds on the District Wide Action Plan document included as an Appendix to the Continuity of Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza which describes operational parameters and mitigations which will be implemented across all NID Departments and service sectors. Department specific operational parameters and mitigations will be captured in Department Specific Action Plans (DSAPs), which are incorporated in to this ISAP as attached Appendices.

B. Description of Incident

This section includes a description of the current [insert event name] pandemic and a brief discussion of the background leading up to the event.

1. Background

This section includes background information that may be useful to those responding to the incident.

Sample Text:

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The disease was first identified in 2019 in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, China, and has since spread globally, resulting in the 2019–20 coronavirus pandemic. Common symptoms include fever, cough, and shortness of breath. Muscle pain, sputum production, diarrhea, and sore throat are less common.

The virus is typically spread during close contact and via respiratory droplets produced when people cough or sneeze. Respiratory droplets may be produced during breathing but it is not considered airborne. It may also spread when one touches a contaminated surface and then their face. It is most contagious when people are symptomatic, although spread may be possible before symptoms appear.

2. Current Status

This section includes information on what is known about the incident and any key assumptions that are made at the time the ISAP is created.

Sample Text:

- *The COVID-19 pandemic has reached the United States and California*
- *As of March 25, 2020 there were 2,974 reported cases in California, including 63 related deaths*
- *Placer County is reporting 30 cases and 1 death as of March 25th*
- *Nevada County is reporting 3 cases as of March 23rd*

C. Anticipated Impacts

This section includes information on any impacts that are currently expected as a result of the pandemic.

The District has prepared this ISAP in anticipation of impacts to its employees and operation. Potential impacts include:


Sample Text:

- *Absenteeism*
- *Global Supply Chain Disruption*
- *Regional and/or Statewide shortages of materials and supplies*
- *Logistic Delays*
- *Project Delays*
- *Workforce exposure*
- *Civil unrest*
- *Delay and/or loss of revenue due to ratepayer financial hardships*

II. Incident Command Structure Organization

A. ICS Organizational Chart

The District's Incident Command Structure (ICS) Organizational Chart for the [insert event name] pandemic is included below for reference and use.



The ICS Organizational Chart and associated Contact Sheet shall be populated, date stamped, and version tagged during the Planning Phase of incident response. The ICS Organizational Chart and Contact Sheet shall be updated as necessary during the course of the event to identify changes in personnel assignments and which roles/groups are activated during the specified operational period.

1. Orders of Succession

NID has identified orders of succession in this ISAP and each DSAP that are at least three deep per position while considering dispersing successors to various geographically separated locations, as appropriate. The purpose of these measures is to maintain a continuity of availability for identified staff – in the event that one of the individuals (or locations) experiences an influenza exposure.

2. Delegations of Authority

The NID Incident Commander shall delegate authority for all activities as depicted in the ISAP and each DSAP. NID has established delegations of authority to be at least three deep to account for necessary transitions between role/group leaders and potential absenteeism due to the nature of the incident. The redundancy and identification of alternate role/group leaders will help maintain continuity of operations over an extended period.

B. ICS Contact Information

The ICS Contact Sheet accompanies the ICS Organizational Chart and includes contact information and techniques that can be used to ensure continuity of communications. The current Contact Sheet is included below for reference and use.

[insert contact sheet]

C. Overall Operational Priorities

This section includes a prioritized list of District Operation Priorities. Listed items are ranked from most important/critical at the top to lower importance/impact at the bottom. The purpose of this ranking is to aid in decision making during event response – when it is necessary to select between activities/actions with limited resources.

Sample Text:

The Nevada Irrigation District will maintain the following operational priorities:

- *Safety of personnel*
- *Safety of infrastructure*
- *Delivery of treated water and raw water to treatment plants*
- *Hydroelectric power generation*
- *Delivery of raw water to facilities not associated with treated water*
- *Recreation*

Note that Department specific operational priorities are listed and ranked in each Department's DSAP.

D. Essential Functions

NID has identified essential functions and services needed to sustain its mission and operations during an emergency event. Overall District essential functions are listed below, in order of priority.

[insert a list of overall District-wide essential functions]

In addition, each service sector (Department) has identified essential functions for their operation in order to fulfill the District's mission and goals. The Department specific essential functions are listed in each DSAP, which are incorporated into this document by attachment.

E. Essential Records Management

NID shall identify, protect, and ensure the ready availability of electronic and hardcopy documents, references, records, and information systems necessary to support essential functions during the [insert event name] pandemic influenza response. As such, the District has opened a Financial Activity Tracking Request (FATR) number and electronic file location for this event.

The FATR number for the [insert event name] is: [list number]

The electronic file location for storing all information related to this event is located here: [link]

III. District Wide Action Plan Elements

This section provides guidance to be followed by all Departments in the event a Phase 4 Pandemic Influenza has been declared in the United States or a Phase 5 Pandemic has been declared by the World Health Organization (WHO). Guidance on the various phases of a pandemic are included in Appendix 1 of the District's Pandemic Influenza Contingency of Operations Plan.

A. Planning

District Management and all Departments shall undertake the following activities and report their status to the Incident Commander in the event this plan is activated:

- Pandemic Response Planning Team (PRPT) will convene and prepare the ISAP
- Department managers will complete DSAP for each Department identified in the ISAP
- Cancel or hold public meetings remotely
- Evaluate currently scheduled projects and activities for the following:
 - priority
 - potential for social distancing
 - impacts of delay
 - potential to complete activities remotely
- Review internal procedures to ensure they are up to date
- Identify critical department activities and cross train staff to ensure functionality can continue
- Estimate the duration of the pandemic and identify supply needs and order supplies as early as possible to ensure they are available
- Incident Commander will activate the Implementation Phase of the Pandemic Coordination and Response

B. Mitigation Activities

Sample Text:

Mitigation measures based on the levels outlined below are detailed in the following table. When not in conflict, mitigation measures should be considered additive as additional criteria levels are reached. Levels shown in the following table are as follows:

- *Level 1 - Phase 4 Pandemic Influenza has been declared in the United States or a Phase 5 Pandemic has been declared by the World Health Organization (WHO)*
- *Level 2 – First confirmed infection of a district employee or immediate family member of a district employee*
- *Level 3 – Twenty-five percent reduction in District workforce due to infection*
- *Level 4 – Fifty percent reduction in District workforce due to infection*
- *Level 5 – Seventy-five percent reduction in District workforce due to infection*

Level	Mitigation Measures
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Practice mitigation measures as directed by Federal, State, and Local Agencies Emphasize importance of good hygiene practices to department staff Begin increased cleaning of common areas All employees to begin self-screening <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fever, chills, headaches, muscle aches, cough, or shortness of breath within the last 24 hours? Close contact with another person who is experiencing some of above symptoms within the last 8 days? Other symptoms associated with the specific disease Mail and package delivery shall not be allowed inside the building anymore. Incoming mail and packages shall be quarantined for a minimum of 24 hours prior to handling. Gloves, a mask, and other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) shall be worn when handling mail. Hands shall be washed immediately after removing gloves. Eliminate paper handling whenever and wherever possible Consider canceling or using an alternate method to conduct all onsite/offsite consultant/contractor visits and meetings Staff shall be sent home if showing symptoms The Information Technology Department shall ensure all laptops are updated and ready for remote use All out of District travel/training shall be canceled Implement vehicle and equipment daily disinfecting protocol
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate Incident Command Structure Cancel all consultant/contractor visits and staff meetings. Require staff assigned laptops shall take them home every night. Consider telecommuting for applicable staff Increase cleaning frequency of common areas.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cancel all non-essential gatherings of staff members Consider alternate schedules to accommodate staff social distancing Cancel all vacations
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Redistribute essential functions to remaining workforce
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shutdown and secure any facilities

C. Continuity Facilities

In addition to heightened safe work practices (social distancing, cancellation of non-essential activities, etc.), plans have been established to commission alternate work facilities for key staff. Separating ICS staff and operational teams into separate facilities, the District intends to reduce the effects of staff impacts due to a virus exposure event at a single location.

Additional duty locations commissioned as continuity facilities for the [insert event name] pandemic are as follows:

[list locations for alternate duty reporting and expected parameters here]

D. Continuity of Communications

The following resources will be available to ensure continuity of communications.

- *List communication methods here.*

E. Reconstitution and Recovery Plan

When community all clear is received;

- Staff begin reporting to the office
- Lobby opens to the public
- Ramp up projects previously postponed
- Initiated after-action review to identify opportunities for improved preparedness
- Establish training program that facilitates future need for cross-departmental functionality

Infected staff will only be allowed to return following a fit for duty authorization from a doctor (or they can be isolated).

APPENDICES

Department Specific Action Plans (DSAP)

Included in this Section of this ISAP are Department Specific Action Plans (DSAPs) for the following NID organizational Departments:

- Administration
- Finance
- Human Resources
- Hydroelectric
- Recreation
- Water Maintenance
- Water Operations

A template for the DSAP follows.

Appendix A: Administration – DSAP

Appendix B: Finance – DSAP

Appendix C: Human Resources – DSAP

Appendix D: Hydroelectric – DSAP

Appendix E: Maintenance – DSAP

Appendix F: Recreation – DSAP

Appendix G: Water Operations – DSAP

[Department] DSAP for [insert event name]

This Department Specific Action Plan (DSAP) is prepared as a supporting document to the Incident Specific Action Plan (ISAP) for the [insert event name] pandemic influenza event. This document and its subsequent revisions are incorporated into the NID [insert event name] ISAP document as an appendix (by attachment).

1 Planning

Content Instructions:

Identify forward planning activities necessary for operation of the Department's specific business objectives. Forward planning activities in a DSAP include specific purchasing, contracting, supply chain research, material staging, testing, or similar topics. Overall planning activities applicable to the entire District are included in the ISAP document and will not be repeated in the DSAP.

Sample Text:

The follow items need will need a procurement schedule to last throughout the emergency. The items of critical need include:

- *Water Treatment Chemicals – Need to coordinate and schedule 2 months of advanced supplies*
- *Fuel for Trucks – Ensure supply at headquarters, or supply credit cards*
- *Laptops with VPN to office set up for 3 additional employees*
- *Disinfectants – wipes, Lysol, etc. If not available, utilize bleach from plants; dilute it down and put in spray bottles.*
- *Laptops*
- *Cellular Communications*

Each employee working space should have a disinfection kit that includes, disinfectant wipes, Lysol (or other substitute), soap. Locations include:

- *Customer Service – Cashiering*
- *Management Assistant (for General Office)*
- *Field Staff Trucks*
- *Plants and Pump Stations*
- *Electric Tech Office*

Establish, Communicate and Reinforce Disinfectant Protocols
Test connectivity and communication of alternate work scenarios

2 Operational Priorities

Content Instructions:

Identify operational priorities specific to the Department, in a priority ranking for reference and use. The operational priority rankings shall be in-line with and complimentary to the overall District Operational Priorities ranked in the ISAP.

Sample Text:

The following list of infrastructure/business priorities should be considered when staffing levels do not allow for full operations. The list below represents the minimum coverage for public health and safety.

1. *Water Supply*
 - a. *Canals that supply a domestic facilities*
 - i. *Cascade*
 - ii. *D.S.*
 - iii. *Newtown*
 - iv. *Combie Phase I*
 - v. *Mag 3*
 - vi. *China System*
 - vii. *Combie Ophir I / II*
 - b. *Critical Raw Water Reservoirs*
 - i. *Deer Creek Diversion*
 - ii. *Loma Rica Reservoir*
 - iii. *Combie*
2. *Water Treatment*
 - a. *E.George*
 - b. *Lake Wildwood*
 - c. *Loma Rica*
 - d. *Lake of the Pines*
 - e. *North Auburn*
 - f. *Smartsville*
3. *Constructive Conveyance Canals*
 - a. *???*
4. *Regulatory Sites*
 - a. *Treated Water Quality Sampling*
 - b. *Dam Safety Checks*
 - c. *Instream flow locations*
 - d. *SB 88 gaging stations*

3 Mitigation Activities

Mitigation measures specific to the [insert Department name] Department, based on the levels as defined in the Continuity of Operation Plan are detailed in the following table. These mitigation measures are considered additive as additional criteria levels are reached, and are in addition to the District Wide Action Plan mitigation measures listed in the ISAP.

Content Instructions:

Identify mitigation activities and associated thresholds specific to the Department. Mitigation activities that are applicable to the entire District are included in the ISAP document and will not be repeated in the DSAP.

Sample Table:

Event Threshold	Department Specific Mitigation Measures
<i>Level 1</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Only supervisory staff to meet during morning meetings. Remaining staff to report directly to field locations to receive assignment.• Work plan for all field staff to be developed day before and posted to common location• Shut down cashiering
<i>Level 2</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Non critical routine outages and maintenance that require high volumes of staff will be postponed• WDO's & WTP Operators to isolate in field and plants.• Train others to assist in customer service to handle additional calls if demands necessitates
<i>Level 3</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Staff to begin daily availability updates calls regardless of schedule• Consolidate treated water production to E. George and shut down connected facilities if demands allow
<i>Level 4</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintenance employees to begin taking District vehicles home and begin assisting with critical canals• Only staff responsible for daily command to report to Headquarters Office.• Critical office staff that has ability to work from home to begin• Consider initiating mutual aid agreements• Water Treatment Operators allowed to operate facilities remotely via SCADA• Billing may have to be extended and flexible due dates allowed• Automated phone service with call stacking will be necessary
<i>Level 5</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Shut down canal system based on order of priority. Shall be based upon domestic supply.

4 Delegations of Authority and Orders of Succession

Activation of the Incident Command System (ICS) will activate the following command and succession structure for [insert Department name] Department functions. In the event that a primary lead is unavailable, the designated secondary will fill the role. The redundancy and identification of alternate role/group leaders will help maintain continuity of operations over an extended period.

Content Instructions:

Identify orders of succession in this DSAP that are at least three deep per position while considering dispersing successors to various geographically separated locations, as appropriate. The purpose of these measures is to maintain a continuity of availability for identified staff – in the event that one of the individuals (or locations) experiences an influenza exposure.

Sample Table:

<i>Position</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Secondary</i>	<i>Tertiary</i>
<i>Department Administration</i>			
<i>Water Treatment Lead</i>			
<i>Water Distribution Lead</i>			
<i>Electrical Lead</i>			
<i>Customer Service Lead</i>			

24-hour contact information for the above individuals is in Department Contact List (attached).